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A theoretical curiosity remains in the Huggett [1993] model as to the
possible existence of a unique and degenerate stationary distribution
of agent types. This coincides with the possibility that an equilib-
rium individual state space may turn out to be trivial in the sense
that every agent never escapes the binding common borrowing con-
straint. In this note, we extend and reinforce the proof of Lemma 3 in
Huggett [1993]. By invoking a simple comparative-static argument,
we establish that Huggett’s result of a unique stationary equilibrium
distribution of agents must be one that is nontrivial or nondegener-
ate.
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The seminal work of Huggett [1993] showed that there exists a unique stationary dis-
tribution of agent types, given by their individual states of asset and income endowment
pairs. In the setting of Huggett [1993], the key insight on the risk-free rate anomaly aris-
ing from representative agent models, was obtained by an appeal to incomplete asset
markets and precautionary saving motives. This framework was one of the key founda-
tions for further quantitative research using heterogenous agent macroeconomics and is
also part of the standard graduate curriculum [see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2006]. In
this class of models, important questions such as asset pricing puzzles [see e.g. Huggett,
1993; Aiyagari, 1994], and ﬁscal policy and taxation [see e.g. Heathcote, 2005], can now
be seriously addressed.
Proving the existence of a unique stationary distribution of agent types in the model
of Huggett [1993] is vital since the stationary equilibrium risk-free rate depends on this
object. To establish this result, i.e. Theorem 2 in Huggett [1993], certain sufﬁciency con-
ditions in theorem 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott [1992] are required to be satisﬁed by the2 T. KAM
model. One of the requirements of the model is compactness of the agents’ individual
state space. Huggett [1993] showed the existence of a compact individual state space in
any equilibrium where agents are behaving optimally. Intuitively, one needs to show
that each agent indexed by an asset-endowment pair, (a,e) 2 S, in making their optimal
competitive decisions, would always remain in the set S every period.
However, the question remains open if this equilibrium individual state space S might
turn out to be trivial, in the sense that every agent’s common borrowing constraint binds
forever. If so, the invariant probability measure of agent types will place all mass on
this minimal credit level. We would like to point out that in establishing the result on
the existence of an endogenously compact S by contradiction, Huggett [1993] omitted to
consider that there might be two other valid contrary hypotheses, which leaves open the
current theoretical curiosity.
In this note, we reinforce the proof of Lemma 3 in Huggett [1993] by showing that in
fact, one can rule out one of these two contrary hypotheses toward the construction of
the proof of Lemma 3, by invoking a simple comparative statics argument. We complete
this missing check here. In other words, we establish that Huggett’s result of a unique
stationary equilibrium distribution of agents must be one that is nontrivial or nondegen-
erate. In practice, for plausible calibrations of the model, one does not encounter the
problem of there being a trivial stationary equilibrium.1 Our result serves to conﬁrm the
experience of numerical examples and to provide a general assurance for practitioners
using numerical methods to solve models along the lines of Huggett [1993].
2. HUGGETT’S MODEL
In this section we ﬁrst revisit the Huggett [1993] model. Then we provide a brief dis-
cussion on the notion of an endogenously compact individual state space and its impli-
cation for the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium distribution of agents.
In the Huggett model, time is discrete, and each period is indexed by t 2 N :=
f0,1,...g.2 The population of agents has mass 1. Each measure zero agent receives a
stream of stochastic endowment of consumption good. Let E = fel,ehg, where eh > el,
be the set of endowment realizations. Each (et)t2N is governed by a given Markov chain
(p,p0) on E, where p is the stochastic matrix and p0 the initial unconditional distri-
bution on E. p(e0je) := Prfet+1 = e0jet = eg > 0, e0,e 2 E, is independent of t, and
another agents’ realization of e. Let X = A  E = [a,+¥)  fel,ehg. The parameter a is
interpreted as an exogenous borrowing constraint.
1A complete set of source codes and numerical solutions is available from the author on request.
2As is the usual convention, we may drop the explicit time-t subscript on variables, e.g. x := xt and
x0 := xt+1.ON ENDOGENOUS COMPACTNESS 3
2.1. An individual’s decision problem. The individual state is x := (a,e) 2 X. The in-
dividual takes as given the aggregate price q > 0. Suppose in an equilibrium there is
a set S := [a,a]  fel,ehg  X that generates Borel s-algebra B(S). The dependence of
the equilibrium q on the aggregate state given by a probability measure y on (S,B(S)) is
implicit.3
Each agent chooses consumption (c) and saving (s0). Let the agent’s feasible action
correspondence be G(q) : A E  B(R+  A), where at each slice of G indexed by (x;q),
we have a description of the feasible choice set of an agent currently named x:4
G(x;q) =

(c,a0) : a + e  c + a0q, c  0, a0  a
	
.










where b 2 (0,1) and u : R+ ! R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice
continuously differentiable.
2.2. Compact equilibrium individual state space S  X. The notion of a stationary
equilibrium is deﬁned in Huggett [1993, p.956]. Given the Markov matrix for the en-
dowment process, p : E ! [0,1], an initial individual state x 2 S for each agent, and
an optimal decision rule, (x;q) 7! ˆ a(x;q), we can induce a time-invariant probability




P(x,B)dy, 8B 2 B(S),
where P : S  B(S) ! [0,1] is the equilibrium transition probability function.5
In Theorem 1, Huggett [1993] provides some sufﬁcient conditions on the model such
that given q, the solution to each agent’s Bellman equation problem has some nice proper-
ties. Speciﬁcally, Theorem 1 in Huggett [1993] establishes that the optimal ˆ a : X ! [a,¥)
is continuous, is either strictly increasing in a, if a > a, or is nondecreasing in a if a = a.
Theorem 1 and Lemmata 1-3 in Huggett [1993] tell us that each agent’s optimal deci-
sion function for credit holdings, ˆ a : X ! [a,¥), must look something like that in Figure
1. In particular, this decision rule has the following properties:
3In Huggett [1993], since the emphasis is on a notion of recursive stationary equilibrium where q is con-
stant, we don’t have to explicitly carry around the distribution of agent types y, as a relevant state variable.
Instead, we only make the agents’ problems dependent on q as a scalar parameter.
4For technical reasons, since A is a continuum, our agent’s decision rules c = c(a,e) and a0 = ˆ a(a,e)
need to be measurable functions belonging to G(q). Hence we restrict such selections to only measurable
subsets in the image of G(q). These measurable subsets are in the Borel s-algebra, B(R+  A) generated by
R+  A 3 (c,a0).
5The details are discussed very nicely in Huggett [1993].4 T. KAM
(1) When the current endowment is el, ˆ a(,el) is well below the 45-line in (a,a0)-
space, if the borrowing constraint is not binding (a > a). That is, a low endow-
ment agent who is not currently credit constrained, accumulates credit below the
current level (Lemma 1); and
(2) When the agent has high endowment, eh, there is an asset level, a, such that the
policy function at eh, ˆ a(,eh), crosses the 45-line in (a,a0)-space. This is proved by
Lemma 3, which uses both Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Thus, in an equilibrium, if there is to be an endogenous a, as shown in Lemma 3 in
Huggett [1993], which is the smallest ﬁxed point satisfying ˆ a(a,eh) = a, then it is straight-
forward to deduce that S := [a,a]  fel,ehg is an endogenously compact metric space.
That is, each agent x beginning in S will always stay within S, or the equilibrium asset
decision rule will be ˆ a : S ! [a,a].
a0
a





FIGURE 1. Characterization of optimal policy function ˆ a : X ! R. When
e = eh, for each a, ˆ a(a,eh) > ˆ a(a,el). If ˆ a(a,e)  a binds, then ˆ a(,e) is
nondecreasing in a.
Theorem 2 of Huggett, applying theorem 2 in Hopenhayn and Prescott [1992], pro-
vides sufﬁcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a unique stationary distri-
bution of agent types, y, for a given q. These conditions in turn include the requirement
that S is a compact metric space.
3. A MISSING STEP
In this section, we complete the missing step required to ensure that indeed Huggett’s
endogenous upper bound a on assets is nontrivial. That is, we are required to show that
a < a < ¥.
The aim (in Huggett’s Lemma 3) is to show that there exists a ﬁxed point a satisfying
ˆ a(a,eh) = a (and that it is a nontrivial ﬁxed point: a > a). A contrary hypothesis to this
would have three possible cases:ON ENDOGENOUS COMPACTNESS 5
H1. ˆ a(a,eh) < a for a > a and ˆ a(a,eh) = a for a = a,
H2. ˆ a(a,eh) > a for a > a and ˆ a(a,eh) = a for a = a, and
H3. There is no a such that ˆ a(a,eh) = a.
These three hypothesis are depicted in Figure 2. In establishing the result on the existence
of an endogenously compact S by contradiction in Lemma 3, Huggett [1993] made only
























FIGURE 2. In proving Lemma 3 in Huggett [1993], suppose there is no a
(> a) such that ˆ a(a,eh) = a. A priori there may be three possible cases for
the component function ˆ a(,eh) that would satisfy this hypothesis. We can
rule out cases H1 and H2.
It turns out, that only one of these contrary hypotheses is possible (i.e. H3), as was
assumed in Huggett [1993]. However, it remains to be shown that this must be the only
case, as we now show in the following lemma, which implies that ˆ a(a,eh) must lie above
a when a = a. Thus, we ensure that we only need to make one contrary hypothesis (H3)
to prove Huggett’s Lemma 3.
Lemma. The decision ˆ a(a,e) is strictly increasing in e for all a  a.
Proof. First, we show the case that a current individual state is (a,e). An optimal con-








, with “=” if ˆ a(a,e) > a. (2)
Consider (a,e) = (a,el). We then perturb el to el + De =: eh. We want to show that
ˆ a(a,eh) > ˆ a(a,el). By Theorem 1 in Huggett [1993], ˆ a(a,el) = a. Then (2) evaluated at








Suppose el increases to el + De =: eh and suppose ˆ a(a,el + De) = ˆ a(a,el) = a. By Lemma
1 in Huggett [1993], this is consistent with the result uc[c(a,el)] = va(a,el)  va(a,eh) =
uc[c(a,eh)]. So either the LHS of (3) declines or remain constant, and by strict concavity
of u, c(a,el)  c(a,eh).
But since u is strictly concave, the agent would prefer to also shift some of the increase
in e towards the next period, and across next-period states. That is, in the RHS of (3),
for each ﬁxed e0 2 E, uc[c(ˆ a(a,e),e0)] must fall. From the agent’s budget constraint, this
implies that ˆ a(a,e) must increase in e. That is, if eh > el, then ˆ a(a,eh) > ˆ a(a,el) = a, so
then (2) would hold with equality at (a,eh).
Second, consider a > a. By Theorem 1 in Huggett [1993], ˆ a(,e) is strictly increasing
and continuous in a > a. By Lemma 1 in Huggett [1993], ˆ a(a,el) < a for a > a. Using
these facts, and since we have shown ˆ a(a,eh) > ˆ a(a,el) = a, then there exists some a such
that ˆ a(a,eh) > a > ˆ a(a,el)  a, and for all a, ˆ a(a,eh) > ˆ a(a,el)  a. 
4. DISCUSSION
The hypotheses H1 (Figure 2.A) and H2 (Figure 2.B) can thus be ruled out since ˆ a(,eh)
must be above the 45-line in (a,a0)-space at the point a. By applying our Lemma, the
proof of Huggett’s Lemma 3 is then complete, where we would have ruled out any pos-
sible trivial equilibrium individual state space as well. The idea is that now, given the
Lemma above, we can just assume one case – that ˆ a(a,eh) > a for all a, so that there is no
ﬁxed point for ˆ a(a,eh) in (a,a0)-space, but then arrive at a contradiction. The conclusion
would have to be that there is an a > a that is the ﬁxed point, and we can take the least
ﬁxed point to be a = a, the endogenous upper bound on assets. Finally, given these re-
sults, Theorem 2 of Huggett follows to establish existence and uniqueness of a stationary
distribution of agent types, which is now guaranteed to be nondegenerate.
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